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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: 
SYSTEMIC REFORMS 
GARY L. WELLS*
 
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well known; the 
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification. 
BACKGROUND 
It has long been conjectured that eyewitness identification evidence 
is a major cause of the conviction of innocent persons.  Although the 
empirical foundations for Justice Brennan’s claim were not in place in 
the 1960s, by the 1980s there were substantial analyses showing that 
mistaken eyewitness identification was the major source of wrongful 
convictions.1  Even more compelling evidence has developed over the 
last decade based on postconviction forensic DNA tests.  Case analyses 
of people in the United States who were convicted of crimes that they did 
not commit (as revealed through later DNA tests) show that mistaken 
identifications account for more of these wrongful convictions than all 
other causes combined.2
In the mid 1970s, experimental psychologists began conducting 
scientific experiments to examine the conditions under which eyewitness 
 * Gary L. Wells, Distinguished Professor of Psychology, Iowa State 
University.  The frequency of citation in this Article conforms to social science format 
rather than the standard format generally followed by the Wisconsin Law Review. 
 1. Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the 
Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 289 (1988). 
 2. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 15 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles 
/dnaevid.pdf; JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Gary L. Wells et al., 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 
22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605 (1998) [hereinafter Wells et al., Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures].  For the most recent statistics on DNA exonerations, see 
Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).  As of 
the date of this writing, the DNA exoneration cases totaled 175. 
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identification evidence is more reliable or less reliable.3  Using 
controlled research methods in which events (for example, staged crimes 
and video events) were created for unsuspecting people, eyewitness 
researchers began isolating variables that could help explain and perhaps 
control the phenomenon of eyewitness misidentification.4  This research 
has proven the general thesis that mistaken eyewitness identifications can 
be very common under certain conditions.5  A major line of this research 
has focused on “system variables,” which are factors affecting the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications that the criminal justice system 
could (or should) control.6  Today, there is a vast body of knowledge in 
scientific psychology about improving the reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence.7  Several recommendations that scientific 
psychologists have made for improving how lineups are conducted are 
particularly compelling.8  These advances in our understanding of how to 
improve eyewitness identification evidence have resulted in some 
jurisdictions making dramatic changes to the procedures used to collect 
and preserve eyewitness identification evidence.9
This Article describes a somewhat expanded set of reform 
recommendations regarding how lineups are conducted and discusses the 
 3. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of 
Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 
13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 588 (1974). 
 4. Id. at 585-86. 
 5. See id. at 588. 
 6. Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables 
and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1546, 1548 (1978). 
 7. See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN 
IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (1995); Gary L. Wells & 
Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 290 (2003). 
 8. Gary L. Wells et al., Recommendations for Properly Conducted Lineup 
Identification Tasks, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 223, 228 (David Frank Ross et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Wells et al., 
Recommendations]; Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 2, at 
627. 
 9. The first state to adopt these reforms was New Jersey. Gina Kolata & Iver 
Peterson, New Jersey Is Trying New Way for Witnesses to Say, ‘It’s Him,’ N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 2001, at A1.  On April 18, 2001, New Jersey Attorney General John Farmer 
issued a directive to all police in New Jersey to begin conducting lineups using the 
methods that have been developed in scientific psychology.  Memorandum from John J. 
Farmer, Jr., N.J. Attorney Gen., to All County Prosecutors, Police Chiefs, Law 
Enforcement Chief Executives, and Col. Carson J. Dunbar, N.J. State Police 
Superintendent (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/ 
faculty/gwells/njguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from John J. Farmer to Carson 
J. Dunbar et al.].  Within 180 days, all law enforcement agencies in New Jersey were to 
enact the new procedures.  Id.  More information about New Jersey’s reforms and the 
reforms that have been made in other jurisdictions is provided infra Part II. 
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logic behind each recommendation.  The logic, however, depends at least 
in part on understanding some basic psychological processes that 
influence mistaken identifications.  Hence, I first describe one of the 
processes by which mistaken identifications occur, namely the “relative-
judgment” process, in simple, nontechnical terms.  The purpose of this 
description is to help promote an understanding of the problem and to 
assist in explaining how certain improvements to lineup procedures can 
reduce the chance of mistaken identification.  Second, I describe the 
problem of false confidence.  False confidence refers to the phenomenon 
in which eyewitnesses have high confidence (or certainty) that they made 
an accurate identification when in fact the identification was mistaken.  
Third, I describe six procedural recommendations that jurisdictions 
should consider in their attempts to improve the reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence.  These six recommendations for identification 
procedures are relatively costless, but not totally without cost.  The 
double-blind recommendation, for instance, can place some manpower 
costs on a department, depending on how it is implemented.  Also, the 
sequential procedure can result in some reduction in the frequency of 
identifications of the suspect.  Fourth, I describe difficulties that have 
prevented these recommendations from being utilized to the betterment 
of criminal justice on a widespread scale  Next, I describe a new 
recommendation, a “reasonable-suspicion rule,” that, although not a part 
of the lineup procedure itself, can have a dramatic effect on reducing the 
chance of a mistaken identification.  Finally, I discuss how some 
jurisdictions have managed to make these reforms and the advantages 
that accrue to jurisdictions that implement these reforms. 
I. UNDERSTANDING LINEUPS AND RELATIVE JUDGMENTS 
A. The Lineup 
A typical police lineup in the United States is composed of six 
people, one is a suspect and the remainder are “fillers.”10  A filler 
(sometimes called a stand-in, distractor, or foil) is a nonsuspect person in 
the lineup who is there merely to help make the process fair to the 
suspect.11  There are a number of variations on this: sometimes the 
 10. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 29 (1999), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf. 
 11. See id.  The word “filler” should be distinguished from the word “suspect,” 
which throughout this Article is used to mean a person who is suspected of being the 
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lineup is a set of photographs (photo lineup), sometimes the lineup is live 
(live lineup).12  All of the discussions in this Article apply to both live 
and photo lineups.  Sometimes lineups contain more or less than six 
people, but six is the most common number.  Sometimes a lineup 
contains more than one suspect, and some lineups have been composed 
totally of suspects, which is a very dangerous practice.13  The purpose of 
the lineup is to see if the eyewitness will identify the suspect as being the 
offender rather than identifying one of the known-innocent fillers.14
B. Relative Judgments 
Although the cognitive processes underlying human recognition 
memory are complex and beyond the scope of this Article, there is one 
underlying process that is both simple to understand and highly 
informative.  Specifically, people have a tendency to select the person 
who looks most like the offender relative to the other members of the 
lineup.15  At first glance, this relative-judgment process would seem to 
be nonproblematic.  In fact, however, the relative-judgment process is 
extremely problematic.  The problem is made apparent by considering 
the fact that there is always someone who looks more like the offender 
than the remaining members of the lineup, even when the lineup does not 
include the offender.  In these cases, eyewitnesses have a tendency to 
select that innocent person and confuse this relative-judgment process 
with recognition memory.16
offender, but might or might not actually be the offender.  Readers must not assume that 
the word suspect means offender, culprit, or perpetrator. 
 12. Id. at 29-30. 
 13. See generally Gary L. Wells & John W. Turtle, Eyewitness Identification: 
The Importance of Lineup Models, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 320 (1986) (evaluating the 
potential error rates in single-suspect versus all-suspect lineup models).  A proper lineup 
has one suspect (who might or might not be the perpetrator), and the remaining lineup 
members are merely fillers.  Id. at 328.  If the eyewitness picks a filler, the error is 
relatively harmless.  Id. at 321.  Having more than one suspect in a lineup, in contrast, is 
one of the worst possible procedures.  Id. at 328.  Analyses show that the chance of a 
mistaken identification increases dramatically when lineups include multiple suspects.  
Id.  Consider, for example, a lineup in which all members are suspects.  In such a case, 
the eyewitness cannot “fail” the test because any person who is identified is considered a 
suspect. The beauty of a proper (single-suspect) lineup is that if the eyewitness is merely 
guessing or has a weak memory, the eyewitness will likely err and choose a filler. 
 14. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 10. 
 15. See Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 92-93 (1984). 
 16. Id. 
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The relative-judgment problem is well illustrated in an experiment 
in which a crime was staged 200 times for 200 separate witnesses.17  All 
of the witnesses were then shown one of two lineups.18  Every witness 
was warned that the offender might or might not be in the lineup.19  Half 
of the witnesses viewed a six-person lineup in which the offender was 
present. Of these 100 witnesses, 21% made no selection at all, 54% 
picked the offender, 13% picked a particular filler, and the remaining 
witnesses spread their choices across the other lineup members.20  The 
other half of the witnesses viewed a lineup in which the offender was 
removed and was not replaced.21  The critical question in this scenario is 
what happened to the 54% of witnesses who would have chosen the 
offender had he been present; did they shift to the no-choice category, 
thereby causing 75% to make no choice?  No.22  Of these 100 witnesses, 
the no-choice rate increased to only 32% whereas the person who was 
previously picked only 13% of the time was now picked 38% of the 
time.23  In other words, even though all of the witnesses were warned 
that the offender might not be in the lineup, removing the offender from 
the lineup led witnesses to shift to the “next best choice,” nearly tripling 
the jeopardy of that person.24  Controlled eyewitness experiments 
consistently show that the most difficult problem for eyewitnesses is 
recognizing the absence of the offender because, even when the offender 
is not in the lineup, there is still someone who looks most like the 
offender relative to other members of the lineup.25
The majority of DNA exoneration cases represent instances in 
which the actual offender was not in the lineup.26  This is precisely what 
 17. Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 560-61 (1993). 
 18. Id. at 561. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id.  Studies reveal that different eyewitnesses might have different 
recollections of who the “next best” person is when the offender is removed.  Hence, it is 
not always the case that the most commonly picked person (after the offender) in an 
offender-present lineup will be the one that most witnesses will shift to when the offender 
is removed. The point, however, is that a substantial proportion of witnesses who pick the 
offender when he or she is present would have picked someone else (rather than making 
no choice) if the offender was not in the lineup. 
 25. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 2, at 613-14. 
 26. See Innocence Project: Mistaken I.D., http://www.innocence 
project.org/causes/mistakenid.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). According to the 
Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law: 
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eyewitness researchers had predicted based on data from controlled 
experiments.27  Unfortunately, there are hundreds of circumstances under 
which police might unknowingly place an innocent suspect in a lineup.  
Sometimes police place an innocent suspect in a lineup because they 
received an anonymous but erroneous tip that the person was the 
offender; sometimes an innocent suspect is placed in a lineup merely 
because the person fits the general physical description and was in the 
vicinity of the crime; sometimes an innocent person came into possession 
of something linked to the crime; and sometimes one or more detectives 
places a suspect in a lineup based on a “hunch.”  Whatever the cause, it 
can never be presumed that the suspect is the offender; if police knew 
that, they would not need the lineup at all.  In Part III of this Article, I 
use this point to discuss the need for a “reasonable-suspicion” criterion 
for placing suspects in lineups. 
C. False Confidence 
The confidence (or certainty) that an eyewitness expresses in his or 
her identification during a lineup is a powerful determinant of whether 
police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors will accept the identification as 
proof that the identified person is the actual offender.  Controlled 
experiments, however, show that eyewitnesses can be both highly 
confident (even “positive”) and yet totally mistaken in an eyewitness 
identification.28  Meta-analyses, which combine the results of a large 
number of controlled experiments, show that the correlation between 
confidence and accuracy in eyewitness identification is likely to be 
somewhere in the range of +.40, where +1.0 is a perfect correlation and 
0.0 is no correlation at all.29  This means that a confident witness is more 
likely to be accurate than is a nonconfident witness.  However, the +.40 
correlation is far from perfect (+1.0), indicating that there are many 
Mistaken eyewitness identification played a role in the vast majority of the 
postconviction DNA exonerations in the United States. Studies of eyewitness 
identification over the past three decades have consistently shown the 
fallibility of eyewitness identifications as well as the unwitting contamination 
of witness recall through many standard eyewitness identification procedures. 
Id. 
 27. See, e.g., Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 2, at 
629. 
 28. See, e.g., Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and 
Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness 
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995) (concluding that “confidence 
may be a very poor and even useless or misleading indicator of witness accuracy”). 
 29. Id. at 319. 
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confident witnesses who are inaccurate and many nonconfident witnesses 
who are accurate. 
In practice, the problem with using eyewitness confidence to infer 
accuracy is even more problematic than the +.40 correlation suggests.  
Recent research shows that “feedback” to eyewitnesses who have made 
mistaken identifications can lead them to inflate their confidence 
dramatically.30  In these experiments, eyewitnesses who had made 
mistaken identifications were simply told, “Good, you identified the 
actual suspect” (confirming feedback) or were told nothing (a control 
condition).31  Later, they were asked a series of questions about their 
identifications, including how certain they were at the time that they had 
identified the actual gunman.32  In the control condition, 15% of these 
mistaken eyewitnesses said that they were positive or nearly positive that 
they identified the actual gunman.33  However, in the confirming 
feedback condition, 50% of the mistaken witnesses reported that they 
were positive or nearly positive.34  This research also showed that most 
eyewitnesses denied that the feedback influenced them and that those 
who denied being influenced were just as influenced as those who 
admitted that they might have been influenced.35
The confidence of an eyewitness should be based on the witness’s 
memory alone, not on feedback from the investigators. The case of 
Ronald Cotton, who was misidentified by Jennifer Thompson, illustrates 
 30. Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on 
the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002); Carolyn Semmler et al., Effects of Postidentification Feedback 
on Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
334, 342-43 (2004); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitness’ 
Recollections: Can the Postidentification Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 138, 140-42 (1999); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the 
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing 
Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 372-73 (1998) [hereinafter Wells & Bradfield, 
Feedback Distorts]; Gary L. Wells et al., Distorted Retrospective Eyewitness Reports as 
Functions of Feedback and Delay, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 42, 51-52 
(2003). 
 31. Wells & Bradfield, Feedback Distorts, supra note 30, at 363.  In some 
instances, the experimenter also gave “disconfirming feedback” by telling the participant 
“Actually, the suspect was number __.”  Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 374. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 372.  Confidence inflation is not the only consequence of this 
feedback.  Confirming feedback (versus no feedback) from the lineup administrator also 
leads witnesses to later report that they had a better view of the culprit, paid more 
attention to the culprit’s face, and to report other retrospective distortions of their 
witnessing experience.  Id. at 372-73. 
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this point.36  When Jennifer Thompson erroneously identified Ronald 
Cotton’s photo from a photo lineup, the detectives turned and said to her, 
“We thought this might be the one.”37  At trial, Thompson was 
absolutely positive that Ronald Cotton was the man who raped her.38  
Like the eyewitnesses who received confirming feedback in the research 
experiments, there is no reason to think that she would be aware of the 
way this influenced her confidence. 
In effect, the influence that feedback has on confidence shows the 
importance of establishing protocols for lineups that police should 
follow.  As described in the recommendation for double-blind testing in 
the next section, confidence inflation is controllable.39
D. Six Recommendations for Lineups 
Trace evidence is usually construed as a physical trace, such as 
blood, semen, fibers, or fingerprints, that might help establish the identity 
of the offender.40  The reliability of eyewitness evidence would improve 
if the justice system were to begin thinking of human memory as a form 
of trace evidence.41  In the case of eyewitness memory, the trace left 
behind by the offender exists in the brain of the eyewitness.42  Of course, 
the memory-as-trace-evidence idea is largely a metaphor at this point 
because physical changes in the brain cannot yet be linked to having seen 
a specific offender.43  Instead, the trace is examined through the verbal 
behaviors of the eyewitness.44  Nevertheless, the metaphor is valuable 
and informative. Human memory can be as fragile, if not more so, as 
various types of physical trace evidence.45  Like physical trace evidence, 
memory traces can be tampered with, destroyed, lost, distorted, or 
contaminated by the procedures that are used to collect it.  There should 
be at least as much attention given to the development of proper 
 36. Innocence Project Case Profiles: Ronald Cotton, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=06 (last visited Mar. 12, 
2006). 
 37. Frontline: What Jennifer Saw, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/dna/interviews/thompson.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See infra Part I.D.5. 
 40. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Scientific Study of Witness Memory: Implications 
for Public and Legal Policy, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 726, 726 (1995). 
 41. Id. at 726, 730. 
 42. Id. at 726. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 727. 
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protocols for collecting memory trace evidence as there is to the 
protocols for collecting blood, semen, fibers, and other physical trace 
evidence.  Some progress in this direction was made by the National 
Institute of Justice’s guide (the “NIJ guide”) for eyewitness evidence that 
was published in October 1999, an effort that I was heavily involved in.46  
However, the NIJ guide falls well short of pressing the full set of six 
recommendations that I describe here and is silent on the “reasonable-
suspicion” criterion that is proposed in Part III of this Article.  
Furthermore, the vast majority of police departments have not changed 
their procedures even to the point of being consistent with the NIJ guide, 
let alone made the kinds of changes required to bring eyewitness 
identification evidence up to the levels that should be achieved. 
1. ONLY ONE SUSPECT PER LINEUP 
A lineup should contain only one suspect with the remaining 
persons being known-innocent fillers.47  A lineup that contains only 
suspects (no fillers) is like a multiple-choice test with no “wrong” 
answer.  In an all-suspect lineup, charges may be brought against anyone 
whom the witness identifies.  If there are fillers, however, an eyewitness 
who is prone to simply pick someone is likely to pick a filler.  Because it 
is known that the identification of a filler is a mistake, charges will not 
be brought against a filler and the unreliability of the witness is revealed.  
Although fundamental and seemingly elementary, this safeguard against 
mistaken identification is commonly violated. The one-suspect 
recommendation applies under all circumstances. For instance, if there 
are multiple suspects even though there was only one offender, each 
suspect should appear in his or her own lineup along with fillers selected 
for that lineup. If there were multiple offenders, each suspect should still 
appear in his or her own lineup. 
2. THE SUSPECT SHOULD NOT “STAND OUT” 
Merely having fillers is not in itself a guarantee that they will serve 
their function of helping to prevent mistaken identifications.48  Consider, 
for instance, a case in which the eyewitness described the offender as 
 46. See TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 
10, at 3-4. 
 47. Id. at 29. 
 48. See R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, What Price Justice? Exploring the 
Relationship of Lineup Fairness to Identification Accuracy, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 303, 
313 (1980). 
  
624 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
being a tall, thin male with dark hair and a moustache.  Suppose now that 
the suspect fits this description but some fillers in the lineup are short, 
others do not have moustaches, and others have light hair.  In this case, 
the suspect will stand out to the witness as being the person who looks 
most like the offender relative to the other lineup members, regardless of 
whether the suspect is the actual offender or not.  Research shows that 
placing an innocent suspect who fits the description of the offender in a 
lineup in which the fillers do not fit the description results in a high rate 
of mistaken identifications of that person, even when absolute similarity 
between the innocent person and the offender is only moderate. 
The problem of choosing fillers for lineups becomes more complex 
under various circumstances, such as when there are multiple witnesses 
who give different descriptions, when the suspect himself does not fit the 
description, when the suspect has unique features that are not easily 
matched by fillers, or when the person became a suspect because he or 
she resembled a composite drawing.  However, there are appropriate 
methods for choosing fillers under all of these circumstances.  This is 
one domain where there is a need for police training because of the 
complex possibilities.  In any case, the test for whether the fillers are 
serving their purpose of helping to protect against mistaken identification 
is whether a nonwitness could pick the suspect out from the lineup by 
merely knowing the description that the eyewitness gave of the offender 
or by answering the question of who stands out in the lineup.49  If the 
answer is “yes,” the fillers are not serving their purpose in the lineup. 
3. CAUTION THAT THE OFFENDER MIGHT NOT BE IN THE LINEUP 
Eyewitnesses approach lineups with the goal of finding the 
offender.50  They should be cautioned that the offender might not be in 
the lineup because they need to understand that they are not “failing” if 
they do not choose someone; after all, the correct answer might be “none 
of the above.”  Importantly, research shows that giving eyewitnesses the 
instruction that the offender might or might not be in the lineup serves to 
lower rates of choosing when the offender is not in the lineup, but it has 
 49. An entire issue of the journal Applied Cognitive Psychology was devoted to 
the problem of measuring the fairness of a lineup.  See Special Issue, Measuring Lineup 
Fairness, 13 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. (1999).  The issues are far more complex than 
presented here, but the overarching idea is that nonwitnesses should be unable to pick the 
suspect out from among the fillers. 
 50. Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup 
Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 486 (1981). 
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little effect on reducing the chance of identifying the offender when the 
offender is present in the lineup.51
4. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCEDURE 
Eyewitness researchers call the standard method for lineups a 
“simultaneous lineup.”52  In a simultaneous lineup, all of the lineup 
members are displayed to the eyewitness at once.53  For instance, in a 
simultaneous photo lineup the suspect’s photo and five filler photos 
might be arranged in two rows of three photos, all mounted on a 
cardboard folder.  This easily permits eyewitnesses to examine all six 
photos at once and determine who looks the most like the offender, 
which tempts them to make a decision based on relative judgments.54  A 
sequential lineup, on the other hand, shows the eyewitness only one 
person at a time and requires the eyewitness to make a “yes,” “no,” or 
“not sure” response to each one before moving on to the next.55   
The psychological experience for the eyewitness is dramatically 
different using the sequential procedure than it is using the simultaneous 
procedure.56  Using the sequential procedure, the eyewitness cannot 
simply compare one photo to another and decide who looks the most like 
the offender relative to the others.57  Although the eyewitness can 
mentally compare the current photo to those presented previously, the 
eyewitness cannot be sure what the next photo will look like; maybe the 
next one will look even more like the offender.58  The sequential 
procedure is conducted such that the witness does not know when the last 
photo is being shown.59  As a result, the sequential procedure appears to 
lead eyewitnesses to set higher criteria for making a positive 
identification because they cannot be sure that they have seen all of the 
lineup members. 
 51. Id. at 486-87; Nancy M. Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A 
MetaAnalytic Review of Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 283, 
285-86 (1997). 
 52. Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and 
Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 459, 459 (2001). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications 
from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 556, 559 (1985). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 563. 
 59. Id. at 559. 
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Research comparing the simultaneous lineup procedure to the 
sequential lineup procedure shows that using the sequential lineup 
procedure produces fewer mistaken identifications.60  Recently, some 
research evidence has also suggested that there are conditions under 
which the sequential procedure might not be superior to the simultaneous 
procedure.61  In particular, there is some concern that the rate of accurate 
identifications could be lower using the sequential lineup.62  However, 
there does not appear to be any evidence that the sequential procedure 
produces a worse ratio of accurate to mistaken identifications than does 
the simultaneous procedure.  Using the data from the meta-analysis by 
Professor Nancy Steblay and her colleagues, there are two ways to 
calculate this ratio.  The first way is to divide the accurate identification 
rate for culprit-present lineups by the average identification rate of any 
given person in the culprit-absent condition.  Using that method, the 
simultaneous procedure yields an accurate-identification ratio of .50/.085 
= 5.88 and the sequential procedure yields an accurate-identification 
ratio of .35/.0467 = 7.49.  The other method of calculating the ratio of 
accurate to mistaken identifications is to use the rate of identifying the 
known-innocent suspect in the culprit-absent condition as the 
denominator.  Using this method, the simultaneous procedure yields an 
accurate-identification ratio of .50/.27 = 1.85 and the sequential 
procedure produces an accurate-identification ratio of .35/.09 = 3.89.  In 
other words, in spite of some reduction in accurate identifications, the 
sequential appears to improve the odds that a suspect, if identified, is the 
actual culprit.  This is consistent with the idea that the sequential 
procedure is more conservative than the simultaneous procedure. 
In actual practice, jurisdictions that have adopted the sequential 
procedure have generally permitted an eyewitness who makes a request 
 60. Brian L. Cutler & J. Steven D. Penrod, Improving the Reliability of 
Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Construction and Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 281, 288 (1988); Lindsay & Wells, supra note 55, at 562; R.C.L. Lindsay et al., 
Biased Lineups: Sequential Presentation Reduces the Problem, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
796, 800 (1991); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Sequential Lineup Presentation: Technique 
Matters, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 741, 744 (1991); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Simultaneous 
Lineups, Sequential Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults 
and Children, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 391, 397 (1997) [hereinafter Lindsay et al., 
Simultaneous Lineups]; Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 
Confidence, and Decision Times in Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 78 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 22, 30 (1993); see also Steblay et al., supra note 52, at 471 (noting that “correct 
rejection rates are significantly higher for sequential than simultaneous lineups” but 
concluding that the “[i]dentification of perpetrators from target-present lineups occurs at 
a higher rate from simultaneous than from sequential lineups”). 
 61. See, e.g., Steblay et al., supra note 52, at 471. 
 62. Id. 
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to view the lineup members again.63  However, a record must be made 
showing that the eyewitness could not make a positive identification 
using the sequential procedure.64  Any identification made on a second or 
later viewing of the lineup should thereby be accorded less credibility 
because the eyewitness apparently felt the need to see all photos before 
deciding.  Why should an eyewitness need to know that they have seen 
all photos before deciding?  Presumably, the eyewitness is making a 
relative judgment, deciding who looks most like the culprit.  Data 
collected from Hennepin County, Minnesota in actual crime cases using 
the sequential procedure are consistent with this presumption.65  
Witnesses who made an identification on the first viewing of the person 
(that is, not needing to see the remaining photos before making a positive 
identification) rarely chose a filler (8%).66  However, witnesses who 
could not decide on the first viewing and took a second “lap” through the 
photos revealed higher rates of filler identifications, an upward trend in 
filler identifications that continued to increase with subsequent 
viewings.67
The sequential lineup procedure appears to be one that good 
eyewitnesses have no trouble with, but gives eyewitnesses whose 
memories are weaker some difficulty.  As a result, there could be some 
loss in accurate identifications using the sequential procedure on the first 
“lap.”  Permitting witnesses to return to the set for a second “lap” could 
pick up any lost accurate identifications, but the second lap also makes 
the lineup a de facto simultaneous procedure.  Hence, careful records 
must be kept to document whether the witness made the identification in 
the pure sequential fashion or not.  Ultimately, policy makers will need 
to balance the chance that a guilty person might not be identified using 
 63. The sequential procedure is used in New Jersey, see Memorandum from 
John J. Farmer to Carson J. Dunbar et al., supra note 9, North Carolina, see N.C. Actual 
Innocence Comm’n, Recommendations for Eyewitness Identification, 
http://www.ncids.org/News%20&%20Updates/Eyewitness%20ID.pdf (last visited Mar. 
29, 2006), and Wisconsin, see Avery Task Force, Eyewitness Identification Procedure 
Recommendations, http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_ 
guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2006). 
 64. See, e.g., TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra 
note 10, at 38; N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, supra note 63; Avery Task Force, supra 
note 63. 
 65. See Amy Klobuchar & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Protecting the 
Innocent/Convicting the Guilty: Hennepin County’s Pilot Project in Blind Sequential 
Eyewitness Identification, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2005) (discussing results 
from the actual application of sequential lineups in the field). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Amy Klobuchar, Nancy M. Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving 
Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind-Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. (forthcoming 2006). 
  
628 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
the sequential lineup procedure against the odds that an innocent person 
will be identified using a simultaneous lineup. 
It is important to note that the sequential lineup procedure is not at 
all similar to the “show-up.”  A show-up is a procedure in which police 
show the eyewitness one person.68 Show-ups tend to occur when a 
suspect who fits the description is found close to a crime scene shortly 
after the crime.  The sequential procedure is qualitatively different from 
the show-up because it is made clear to the eyewitness in the sequential 
procedure that there are multiple persons to be viewed.  The idea behind 
using a show-up is to present the suspect to the witness while the 
witness’s memory is still fresh.  Research indicates, however, that show-
ups produce higher rates of mistaken identification than do simultaneous 
lineups or sequential lineups, even when the witness is tested soon after 
the witnessed event.69  The reason for the higher rate of mistaken 
identifications when using show-ups is mainly because show-ups do not 
include fillers that protect an innocent suspect.70
5. DOUBLE-BLIND TESTING 
The person who administers a lineup should not know which person 
in the lineup is the suspect.71  In social and medical sciences, this type of 
procedure is called “double-blind” testing.72  Consider, for instance, the 
use of placebo control conditions in testing new drugs.  Not only is the 
patient unaware of whether he or she received the drug or a placebo 
(single-blind), but so are any medical personnel who examine the 
patients (hence, the term “double-blind”).  In this context, “blind” is 
figurative, not literal.  Although the reason for keeping the patient blind 
 68. See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 2, at 630. 
 69. Dawn J. Dekle et al., Children as Witnesses: A Comparison of Lineup 
Versus Showup Identification Methods, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1996); 
Lindsay et al., Simultaneous Lineups, supra note 60, at 402; A. Daniel Yarmey et al., 
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
459, 475 (1996).  In Richard Gonzalez et al., Response Biases in Lineups and Showups, 
64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1993), the authors suggest that show-ups do not 
result in higher misidentification rates than lineups.  However, under the assumption of a 
single-suspect lineup, the rates of misidentifying a suspect must be divided by six (the 
number of lineup members), which makes the rate of suspect identifications lower for 
lineups than for show-ups. 
 70. See Michael S. Wogalter et al., Suggestiveness in Photospread Line-ups: 
Similarity Induces Distinctiveness, 6 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 443, 444 (1992) 
(“[L]ine-ups are more fair than show-ups because the probability of choosing an innocent 
suspect is distributed across several faces of a line-up.”). 
 71. See Wells et al., Recommendations, supra note 8, at 236; Wells, supra note 
15, at 93. 
 72. See Bradfield et al., supra note 30, at 118. 
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as to whether he or she received the drug or a placebo is obvious, the 
need to keep the tester blind is less obvious. 
The reason for keeping the tester blind is to prevent the tester from 
unintentionally influencing the outcome of the results.  The double-blind 
testing recommendation for lineups does not assume that the tester 
intends to influence the eyewitness, or is even aware of any such 
influence.  This is not an integrity issue.  Instead, it is merely an 
acknowledgment that people in law enforcement, like people in 
behavioral and medical research, are influenced by their own beliefs and 
unknowingly “leak” this information, both verbally and nonverbally, in 
ways that can influence the person being tested.73  Vast scientific 
literature shows that the need for double-blind testing procedures is 
particularly crucial when there is close face-to-face interaction between 
the tester and the person being tested.74
The need for double-blind lineup testing is particularly critical for 
photo lineups. This is because, unlike live lineups, there is no right to the 
presence of defense counsel in photographic identification procedures 
and, hence, no one to observe possible suggestiveness in the procedure75  
Typically, the primary police investigator in the case will assemble the 
photo lineup, contact the eyewitness, and meet with the eyewitness for 
the purpose showing these photos.  The investigator, of course, knows 
which person in the photo lineup is the suspect. 
There are innumerable ways that an investigator can influence an 
eyewitness when administering a lineup. Suppose, for instance, the 
investigator placed his or her suspect in position three.  Upon viewing 
the lineup, suppose the witness utters, “Well, number two . . . .”  A 
natural and understandable response of the investigator might be, “Now, 
be sure you look at all the photos.”  The investigator might simply think 
that the eyewitness is not examining all of the photos, but, in effect, the 
investigator is shaping the eyewitness to move off of picture two and 
consider another one instead.  Now suppose what the investigator might 
do if the first words uttered by the witness were, “Well, number 
three . . . .”  Given this response, the investigator might say, “Tell me 
about number three.”  Notice how the investigator’s knowledge that 
number two is a filler and number three is the suspect can shape the 
nature of the interaction such that the witness’s identification behavior is 
not coming strictly from memory, but instead is being influenced by the 
 73. ROBERT ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 
(1976). 
 74. See, e.g., Monica J. Harris & Robert Rosenthal, Mediation of Interpersonal 
Expectancy Effects: 31 Meta-Analyses, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 363, 378 (1985). 
 75. United States vs. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
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investigator’s knowledge that the fillers in the lineup are in fact “just 
fillers.”  Concerns about such influence are not restricted to verbal 
behaviors.  Nonverbal behaviors, such as smiling, frowning, and leaning, 
are particularly difficult for the tester to inhibit.  Yet, these cues can 
affect the eyewitness. 
Double-blind lineup procedures are needed not only to prevent the 
investigator from unintentionally influencing which person the 
eyewitness picks, but also are needed to prevent the investigator from 
influencing the certainty of the eyewitness.  The previous discussion of 
false confidence is particularly relevant here.76  Giving eyewitnesses 
feedback suggesting that they identified the right person can cement false 
memories and erase any original uncertainty.  This feedback is often 
explicit and verbal (for example, “Good, that is the guy we thought it 
was”), but can be nonverbal as well (such as facial expressions and 
posture).  Many experienced police investigators will acknowledge that 
eyewitnesses who pick someone will sometimes turn to the investigator 
and ask, “Did I get him?”  With double-blind testing, the answer would 
have to be “I don’t know.”  Even better, by telling the eyewitness ahead 
of time that the lineup administrator does not know which person in the 
lineup is the suspect, the eyewitness will not be monitoring the lineup 
administrator for verbal and nonverbal cues that could affect their 
selection or affect the confidence the eyewitness expresses in that 
selection. 
6. COLLECT A CONFIDENCE STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE 
IDENTIFICATION 
At the time an eyewitness makes an identification, a statement 
should be obtained from the eyewitness indicating how confident he or 
she is that the person identified is the offender.  Of course, this assumes 
double-blind testing: the statement should be obtained by a lineup 
administrator who does not know which lineup member is the suspect. 
The point is to assess the confidence of the eyewitness before the 
eyewitness can be influenced by other events, such as learning the status 
of the identified person.  As discussed previously, the confidence of an 
eyewitness is the primary determinant of whether people will assume the 
identification to be accurate, even though the confidence of an 
eyewitness is readily influenced by feedback. 
Eyewitnesses cannot be kept in the dark about their identification 
decisions forever.  Victim-witnesses, for instance, probably have a right 
to know fairly soon whether the person they identified was the suspect or 
 76. See supra Part I.C. 
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a filler.  However, this information need not be given to an eyewitness 
prior to getting a confidence statement.  If needed, an eyewitness could 
be debriefed soon after this confidence statement is obtained, but an 
eyewitness should never be debriefed (or left to the influence of other 
events) prior to getting a confidence statement. 
Jurors have a right to expect that an eyewitness’s expression of 
confidence in an identification is based purely on the eyewitness’s 
independent recollection.  If the eyewitness was in fact uncertain at the 
time of the identification, that fact should be a matter of record that is 
known to the police, the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury.  The 
eyewitness’s initial uncertainty is lost forever, however, if it is not 
assessed in an unbiased manner at the time of the identification. 
II. IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES TO INCREASE THE RELIABILITY OF 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
A. Benefits of Implementation 
If implemented, these recommendations for lineups would advance 
justice in several ways.  First, implementation of these recommendations 
would benefit innocent suspects because they would be less likely to be 
misidentified.  Second, implementation of these procedures would help 
keep the focus of investigations on guilty persons.  It is often forgotten 
that a mistakenly identified suspect usually also means that the actual 
offender is still at large, perhaps re-offending.  Jennifer Thompson’s 
misidentification of Ronald Cotton, for instance, stopped the search for 
the real rapist, Bobby Poole, who continued to assault victims.77  Third, 
implementation of these procedures would be of assistance to those 
involved in evaluating the identification testimony (such as prosecutors, 
judges, and jurors).  Although mistaken identifications can still happen 
even when these procedures are followed, prosecutors, judges, and jurors 
can be assured that the procedures themselves are not a contributing 
factor.  Finally, the use of these procedures would lessen the need for 
expert testimony because expert testimony commonly focuses on the 
inadequacies of the procedures used in lineups. 
 77. See supra Part I.C. 
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B. Costs of Implementation 
These procedural recommendations are largely costless.78  With the 
possible exception of very small police departments, these changes to 
procedures could be readily implemented within current levels of 
funding in a department.79  Continuing police training programs already 
exist and this material could simply be incorporated into existing 
training. 
C. The Difficulty of Implementation 
Given the high benefits and low cost of implementing these 
procedures, it seems odd that fundamental changes to the way lineups are 
conducted in the United States have not yet taken place.  I believe that 
there are four main factors that account for why change has not happened 
faster.  These four factors are: (1) a communication gap, (2) the police 
tradition, (3) a lack of direction from prosecutors and courts, and (4) the 
pervasiveness of local control. 
1. COMMUNICATION GAP 
These recommendations and their empirical foundations were 
developed within the field of experimental psychology, not law 
enforcement.  Almost all of the research literature is published in 
scientific psychology journals, which is generally written at a technical 
level and is not readily accessible.  Traditionally, law enforcement does 
not look to experimental psychology for direction, and experimental 
psychologists typically have no experience dealing with law 
enforcement.  Hence, paths of communication are poorly cut and it takes 
time to clear those paths. 
2. POLICE TRADITION 
Second, like most professions, people in the police profession use 
procedures handed down to them from their predecessors.80  Police 
usually learn to conduct lineups by watching an experienced officer or by 
 78. Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological 
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 786 (1995). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Gary L. Wells et al., A Successful Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 
AM. PSYCHOL. 581, 591 (2000) (reporting that, once police are familiarized with the 
reform proposals and their benefits, they are receptive to the proposals, and suggesting 
reasons for the expected resistance from police). 
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simply using their own common sense and cursory understanding of the 
concept of a lineup.  No one ever told them about the fragility of human 
memory, the subtle ways in which procedures influence witnesses, or the 
need for double-blind testing because the generation that preceded them 
was not told.  Departmental procedure manuals are seldom consulted 
and, when they are, they do not contain these six procedural 
recommendations.  Training on eyewitness identification in law 
enforcement is commonly a ten-minute discussion restricted to legal 
requirements, such as permitting counsel to be present at live lineups if 
the suspect has already been charged with the crime.  In general, law 
enforcement has not developed significant expertise and direction from 
within law enforcement, as evidenced, for instance, by the absence of 
significant writings, research, and recommendations from within law 
enforcement on eyewitness identification issues. 
3. LACK OF DIRECTION FROM PROSECUTORS AND COURTS 
A third reason for slow change in how lineups are conducted is that 
there has been no significant pressure from prosecutors and courts to 
improve these procedures.81  Police typically look to the courts and to 
prosecutors who, in effect, tell them what is acceptable or unacceptable 
evidence for purposes of successful prosecution.  Why have prosecutors 
not provided this leadership in improving lineup procedures?  There 
seem to be several reasons.  First, most prosecutors are not truly familiar 
with the issues.82  Furthermore, those prosecutors who are familiar with 
the issues usually develop this familiarity in the context of trying to keep 
an eyewitness expert from testifying for the defense.83  In their attempts 
to keep eyewitness experts from testifying for the defense, prosecutors 
have come to perceive the issue erroneously as a defense issue.84  
Perhaps more importantly, some prosecutors seem to fear that any 
admission that new lineup procedures are better than the old procedures 
(for example, that sequential is better than simultaneous) would 
undermine confidence in the convictions that they have secured using the 
old procedures.85  Along these same lines, some prosecutors feel that 
admitting that there are problems with past procedures might even open 
up grounds for appeal from persons who were convicted using those 
 81. Cf. Sean Gardiner, Dynamics of Righting a Wrong: The DA’s Role in 
Reversals, NEWSDAY (Queens, N.Y.), Dec. 10, 2002, at A35 (describing an exception to 
the general attitude of prosecutors when reacting to possible wrongful convictions). 
 82. See Wells et al., supra note 80, at 591-92. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
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procedures.86  There is no reason to believe that improving lineup 
procedures would in fact open up grounds for appeal in old cases.  
Indeed, no form of evidence improvement could ever occur if the legal 
system had to operate that way. 
While the preceding paragraph helps explain why prosecutors have 
not shown leadership on the issue, why have trial judges not given 
directives to police to improve lineup procedures?  The reasons are 
similar those affecting prosecutors.  In addition, judges typically do not 
see it as their role to tell police how to collect evidence unless it concerns 
constitutional or state-mandated rights issues (such the right to counsel, 
the implementation of Miranda warnings, or state-specific due process 
protections).  Furthermore, in jurisdictions where judges have tried to 
order improvements to how police conduct lineups along the lines of 
these six recommendations, opinions have been rendered suggesting that 
the judges do not have the authority to do so.87
4. LOCAL CONTROL 
There are about 13,000 law enforcement departments in the United 
States.88  The vast majority of these departments are controlled locally, 
usually at the county or municipal level.  How police conduct their 
investigations (and, hence, how a lineup would be conducted) is 
determined at this local level.  Although the advantages for this local 
control probably outweigh the disadvantages, local control creates great 
difficulty for effecting widespread changes.  New Jersey was able to 
effect change for the entire state because New Jersey law gives its 
attorney general authority over all police in the state.89  That cannot be 
done in other states where these types of procedures are determined by 
individual departments.  Occasionally, an individual department will 
show some leadership.  For example, in March 2000, the Clinton, Iowa 
police chief ordered his department to follow the eyewitness 
identification procedures set out in the NIJ guide that was published in 
 86. See id. 
 87. Tom Perrotta, First Sequential Lineup Is Held in Staten Island, N.Y. L.J., 
Apr. 29, 2002, at 3 (noting that one Brooklyn judge agrees that courts have no 
jurisdiction over lineup procedures). 
 88. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law Enforcement 
Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). 
 89. See Memorandum from John J. Farmer to Carson J. Dunbar et al., supra 
note 9.  The New Jersey attorney general distributed the memorandum in April 2000, 
promulgating new lineup procedures for all of the state’s police departments.  Id. 
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November 1999.90  But, there is no program in place, nor is there one 
under consideration by any federal agency at this point, to educate local 
departments or assist them in any way in making these important 
changes to their lineup procedures.  Accordingly, little change is 
happening on any level of national coordination. 
III. THE REASONABLE-SUSPICION CRITERION: A NEW 
RECOMMENDATION 
A seventh recommendation needs its own Part for two reasons.  
First, this recommendation, unlike the preceding six, does not concern 
lineup procedure per se in the same way that the preceding six do.  
Second, this recommendation is a new one, developed specifically for 
this issue of the Wisconsin Law Review. 
The reasonable-suspicion recommendation for lineups is rather 
straightforward: the decision by crime investigators to conduct a lineup 
around an individual should be restricted, within certain limits, primarily 
to situations in which there is a reasonable belief that the individual is in 
fact the culprit.  This reasonable belief that the individual is the culprit is 
what I call reasonable suspicion.  For the most part, this recommendation 
is based on the proposition that there is inherent jeopardy to an innocent 
suspect who is the subject of any lineup procedure.  In fact, however, full 
development of the reasonable-suspicion recommendation is much more 
complex than the simple proposition of inherent jeopardy.  The 
remainder of this Part develops the reasonable-suspicion 
recommendation more fully. 
A. The Statistical Basis for Reasonable Suspicion 
The reasonable-suspicion recommendation for lineups states that a 
reasonable basis for suspecting a person should exist before placing that 
person (or his or her photo) into a lineup.  What constitutes reasonable 
suspicion?  In the lineup context, I mean something less than probable 
cause, which is also difficult to define.  Hence, the definition of 
reasonable suspicion is necessarily a policy decision, not a scientific 
decision.  The reasonable-suspicion recommendation is based in part on 
the proposition that, regardless of how pristine the lineup procedure, 
there is inherent jeopardy to an innocent suspect by being placed (or 
 90. See supra text accompanying note 46.  Although there are no sources 
immediately available to document the actions of the Clinton, Iowa police department, 
the author worked personally with the law enforcement agency to implement the 
aforementioned changes. 
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having one’s photo used) in a lineup and displayed to eyewitnesses.  It is 
also based on the proposition that conducting lineups that do not contain 
the actual culprit has the probabilistic risk of ruining the eyewitness for 
later possible identifications if the actual culprit later becomes a focus of 
the investigation. 
Previous empirical and conceptual writings have provided evidence 
to support the proposition that mistaken eyewitness identification rates 
are directly tied to the odds that the lineup contains the actual culprit in 
question.91  The odds that an eyewitness will be tested using a lineup that 
does not contain the culprit can be expressed as probabilities or 
percentages or base rates.  For a single lineup, the language of 
probability is usually used, as in “What is the pre-lineup probability that 
this suspect is the actual culprit?”  Across a large sample of lineups, the 
language of percentages or base rates is usually used, as in “What 
percentage of lineups contain the actual culprit and what percentage have 
an innocent suspect instead?” or “What is the base rate for lineups 
containing the actual culprit rather than an innocent suspect?”  Here, I 
use the language of base rates.  Regardless of the language, there is a 
direct mathematical relation between this base rate and the chance that an 
innocent suspect will be mistakenly identified as well as the chance that 
the actual culprit will be identified.  This mathematical relation is readily 
expressed and displayed using Bayesian statistics.92
It is important to keep in mind that the base rate for exposing 
eyewitnesses to culprit-absent lineups is not a single figure.  Instead, it is 
a variable that is influenced by jurisdictional practices.  In some police 
departments, for instance, investigators might put together a photo lineup 
based on a mere hunch (for example, “Sounds like it might be Joe”) 
whereas other departments might be reluctant to conduct any type of 
identification procedure until there are evidence-based reasons to believe 
that this particular individual is likely to be the culprit.  For didactic 
purposes, I will call the former department the “low criterion” 
department and the latter the “high criterion” department.  In this case, 
criterion refers to how much evidence each department needs (a low or 
high amount) to make an affirmative decision to construct a lineup and 
present it to the eyewitness(es). 
 91. Gary L. Wells & R.C.L. Lindsay, On Estimating the Diagnosticity of 
Eyewitness Nonidentifications, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 776, 776-77 (1980); Gary L. Wells & 
Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Identification: Information Gain from Incriminating and 
Exonerating Behaviors, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 155, 155, 166 (2002); 
Wells & Turtle, supra note 13, at 320, 329. 
 92. For a general overview of Bayesian statistics, see J. ARTHUR WOODWARD ET 
AL., INTRODUCTION TO LINEAR MODELS AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 14-15 (1990). 
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In order to fully appreciate the direct relation between the risk of an 
innocent suspect being mistakenly identified and the base rate problem, it 
is critical to keep in mind that a lineup includes only one suspect, who 
might or might not be the culprit, and the remaining lineup members are 
merely fillers.93  Given this structure, a mistaken identification of an 
innocent suspect cannot occur when the actual culprit is in the lineup 
because the remaining members of the lineup are known-innocent 
fillers.94  The identification of a filler is a mistake, of course, but not a 
mistake that would result in charges against the filler. By the same logic, 
an eyewitness cannot identify the actual culprit if the suspect is innocent 
because, by definition with a single-suspect lineup, the lineup does not 
contain the culprit. These unique properties to lineups permit some 
illuminating mathematical treatments that show how the base rate affects 
error rates. 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 I display two Bayesian curves in Figure 1 that illustrate the 
mathematical relation between the base rate and rates of errors for a 
particular level of eyewitness accuracy.  The base rate represents the 
percentage of lineups that contain the actual culprit.  Figure 1 is based on 
a constant rate of performance by the eyewitnesses, in this case a 
presumed 95% accuracy rate.  For our purposes, this means that 
eyewitnesses will identify the suspect 95% of the time if suspect is the 
culprit and will not identify the suspect 95% of the time if the suspect is 
innocent.  Although a 95% accuracy rate is considerably higher than 
 93. See TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 
10, at 29. 
 94. See id. 
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most eyewitness scientists would attribute to eyewitnesses, I use this 
high accuracy rate to illustrate that even when the accuracy rate is high, 
error rates can balloon if one permits a high frequency of innocent 
suspects to be placed in lineups.  In Figure 1, the negatively decelerating 
curve (which starts 100% on the left and runs to 0% on the right) 
represents the probability that a suspect, if identified, is in fact innocent.  
The positively decelerating curve (which starts at 0% on the left and runs 
to 100% on the right) represents the probability that a suspect, if 
identified, is the actual culprit.  Notice that the relation between the base 
rate and the probabilities of mistaken and accurate identifications is not 
linear, but is curvilinear.  This curvilinear relation between base rates and 
posterior probabilities is beyond the intuitive grasp of most people.95  
And yet, it is extremely important for understanding fully how lineup 
base rates impact error rates. 
Certain values in Figure 1 are useful to note. First, when the base 
rate is exactly 50%, the probability that a suspect, if identified, is the 
culprit is equal to the 95% performance accuracy rate of the 
eyewitnesses.  As the base rate drops below 50%, the probability that the 
suspect, if identified, is the actual culprit drops.  For instance, at a 30% 
base rate, the obtained probability that a suspect, if identified, is the 
actual culprit drops to less than 80%.  When the base rate is 10%, where 
the two curves intersect, the chance that a suspect, if identified, is the 
actual culprit drops to 50% (a mere 50/50 proposition, despite an overall 
accuracy rate of 95%). 
Operating at the low end of the base rate—where the percentage of 
lineups containing the actual culprit is low—yields some disturbingly 
high probabilities that an identification of a suspect is actually a mistaken 
identification of an innocent person.  For instance, when the lineup base 
rate is 30%, the chance that an identification of a suspect is in fact 
mistaken rises above 20% despite a 95% accuracy rate for eyewitnesses 
in this example.  This is a graphic illustration of why it is important to 
ask the question of what criteria are used to decide whether to conduct a 
lineup.  A policy that permits individuals to be placed in lineups on mere 
hunches or wild guesses could very well yield a high rate of mistaken 
identifications. 
Consider a concrete case in which there are five people—A, B, C, 
D, and E—who fit the eyewitness’s description of the culprit who could 
have committed a crime.  For simplicity, assume that no one other than 
these five people could have committed the crime.  Suppose further that 
the detectives are aware of only one of them, person B, so they place 
 95. D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 237, 237-51 (1973). 
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person B in a lineup. In this case, we could say that the base rate is a 
mere 20% because there is a 20% chance that B, who is in the lineup, is 
the actual culprit.  Here, even if the eyewitness was 95% accurate, an 
identification of the suspect yields a 31% probability that suspect B is not 
the actual culprit.  Consider a slight variation of the problem.  Again, 
there are five suspects, but this time the detectives are aware of all five.  
Based on interviews with the suspects, the detectives decide that suspect 
B is twice as likely as any one of the other suspects to be the culprit.  
This means that suspect B has a 33.33% chance of being the culprit and 
each of the others has only a 16.67% chance of being the culprit.  Based 
on this knowledge, the detectives decide to conduct a lineup including 
suspect B.  In this instance, an identification of suspect B yields an 
approximately 18% chance that suspect B is not actually the culprit.  
Note that this is still a relatively high chance that the suspect, if 
identified, is not the culprit despite a 95% accuracy rate for the 
eyewitness.  Suppose, however, the detectives investigate the case at a 
deeper level and discover circumstantial evidence that indicates that 
there is a 90% probability that suspect C committed the crime.  Under 
these conditions, an identification of suspect C yields a chance of merely 
1.2% that suspect C is not the actual culprit (and a 98.8% probability that 
suspect C is the culprit). 
B. The Order-of-Evidence Conundrum 
A purely mathematical treatment of the base rate problem does not 
itself dictate a need for reasonable suspicion to be obtained prior to the 
lineup.  This is because the mathematics themselves are indifferent to the 
order in which the evidence is obtained.  For example, if there is some 
non-eyewitness evidence indicating an 80% probability that an individual 
is the culprit and a 95% accurate eyewitness identifies that individual 
from a lineup, the probability that the individual is the culprit is 97.5% 
regardless of whether the non-eyewitness evidence was collected before 
or after the eyewitness attempted the identification.  In other words, 
evidence has the commutative property found in multiplication.  Hence, 
why should there be a reasonable-suspicion criterion in place before a 
lineup is conducted if the evidentiary basis for reasonable suspicion 
could be obtained after the lineup? 
The order of the evidence makes no difference in many, if not most, 
situations.  But, this is not the situation with lineups because of the 
problem of the “spent eyewitness.”  Any time an eyewitness views a 
lineup there is some probability that the eyewitness will select a filler and 
this probability is higher if the lineup does not contain the culprit than if 
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it does contain the culprit.96  Suppose that an eyewitness were shown a 
lineup in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the suspect is innocent, 
and the eyewitness selected a filler instead.  Suppose now that additional 
investigation (or a tip) uncovers a new suspect, someone for whom there 
is a very strong reason to believe is the culprit.  The eyewitness, having 
already picked a filler, is now considered “spent” or “spoiled” for 
purposes of conducting a lineup because that eyewitness has already 
misidentified a filler.  Having shown the eyewitness the first lineup 
prematurely, the potential for credible identification evidence against the 
new suspect is forever lost.  To prevent this result, the reasonable-
suspicion criterion should be used prior to conducting a lineup. 
How might the reasonable-suspicion recommendation be 
implemented in practice?  I am suggesting that this reasonable-suspicion 
problem be included in the training of crime investigators in conjunction 
with other training on how to conduct lineups.  Generally, larger police 
departments have multiple detectives working under a supervisor.  In 
these departments, the supervisor could require that detectives present 
the supervisor with reasonable suspicion before conducting any type of 
identification procedure.  Even if the supervisors did not exercise a veto, 
they could remind the detectives of the potential risks of showing the 
eyewitness a lineup that does not contain the actual culprit.  For example, 
“If this isn’t the guy who did it, the witness might pick a filler and we 
would never be able to get an identification of the real guy.  Are you sure 
that you are ready to show the eyewitness a lineup?”  The point is that 
any system that requires investigators to recognize the dangers of doing 
lineups on a mere hunch would be better than the current situation in 
which there appears to be no formal consideration of the reasonable-
suspicion idea at all. 
IV. SUCCESSFUL REFORM EXPERIENCES 
Successful eyewitness identification reforms have been made in a 
number of jurisdictions.  I have already described the New Jersey 
reforms, which followed a model that other states are not generally able 
to replicate because, unlike New Jersey, other states do not have systems 
in which authority over police procedures are vested in a single entity.97  
Nevertheless, North Carolina has managed to effect widespread reform 
through the creation of a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the 
 96. Wells & Olson, supra note 91, at 161. 
 97. See, e.g., N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, supra note 63. 
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North Carolina Supreme Court, I. Beverly Lake.98  Although this 
commission has no official authority over independent police 
departments across North Carolina, it is composed of credible and 
powerful individuals, such as the state attorney general, district attorneys, 
police chiefs, police trainers, and others.  Through public hearings and 
press releases, the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission has 
endorsed all six of the procedural recommendations described in Part I of 
this Article99 and many police departments in North Carolina have now 
started to implement these reforms.100  State police training, for both new 
recruits and continuing training of current police, now incorporates these 
reforms to eyewitness identification procedures.101
Wisconsin used a somewhat different approach.  In addition to 
establishing a commission that recommended these reforms, the state 
attorney general used her justice department to develop 
recommendations and educate law enforcement across the state on the 
need to adopt these recommendations in their local jurisdictions.102  
Although the Attorney General of Wisconsin does not have the authority 
to force these changes on local police jurisdictions, she realized that she 
had the “bully pulpit” and used it to great effect throughout the spring 
and summer of 2005.  Some Wisconsin police departments have now 
adopted the reforms103 and more will follow. 
In Minnesota, although nothing significant has happened at the state 
level, the Hennepin County Attorney, Amy Klobuchar, in concert with 
the Minneapolis Police Department and other police departments in the 
county, took it upon themselves to begin using these reform procedures 
as a pilot project.104  Their experiences and data from this project are 
 98. Matthew Eisley, Officers Weigh Stricter Policy; Suspects’ IDs Are 
Conference’s Focus, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 11, 2004, at B1. 
 99. See N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, supra note 63 (setting forth its 
recommendations).  It should be noted, however, that the Commission did allow for 
multiple suspects in a lineup as long as the number of fillers was adjusted proportionally.  
Id.  This is not a violation of the general principle underlying the single-suspect 
recommendation as long as each suspect has their own appropriate number of fillers.   
 100. See Eisley, supra note 98 (discussing the various North Carolina police 
departments that have agreed to adopt the Actual Innocent Commission’s 
recommendations). 
 101. See id. 
 102. PEG LAUTENSCHLAGER, WIS. ATTORNEY GEN., EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
BEST PRACTICES (2005), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/ 
tns/ag%20letterintrodojweb.pdf. 
 103. See Winn S. Collins, Looks Can Be Deceiving: Safeguards for Eyewitness 
Identification, WIS. LAW., Mar. 2004, at 8. 
 104. Klobuchar & Caligiuri, supra note 65, at 19. 
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very positive and are described in a recent article.105  Similarly, although 
no significant action has been taken at the state level in Massachusetts, 
the Suffolk County District Attorney, in concert with the Boston Police 
Department and other police departments in the county, decided to adopt 
these reform procedures for eyewitness identification.106  Other 
jurisdictions that have adopted these reforms include Northampton, 
Massachusetts,107 Virginia Beach, Virginia (and now some other 
locations in Virginia),108 and Santa Clara County, California.109  
Undoubtedly, there are some other small jurisdictions that have made 
these reforms, but there is no official tracking mechanism to document 
the reforms being made. 
Importantly, the jurisdictions that have made these reforms are quite 
willing to share their experiences with other jurisdictions that are 
considering such reforms.  For example, New Jersey’s Deputy Attorney 
General, Lori Linskey, who has been at the center of New Jersey’s lineup 
reforms, has provided her assistance to North Carolina and other 
jurisdictions.110  Chris Mumma, the Executive Director of the North 
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission,111 has traveled extensively to 
potential reform jurisdictions to describe the successful methods used in 
North Carolina.  Ken Patenaude, of the Northampton, Massachusetts 
Police Department, has generously appeared in different venues to 
describe his department’s successful transition to these new identification 
procedures.112  And Ken Hammond,113 of the Wisconsin Department of 
 105. See id. at 24. 
 106. Suzanne Smalley, Police Update Evidence Gathering: Suspect 
Identification Is Focus of Changes, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2004, at B1. 
 107. See NORTHHAMPTON POLICE DEP’T, ADMINISTRATION & OPERATIONS 
MANUAL: EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE (2005), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Northampton_MA_ID_Protocols.pdf. 
 108. See Karin Brulliard, Revamping Va.’s Police Lineups: New Methods Urged 
to Curb Mistakes, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at C1. 
 109. See POLICE CHIEF’S ASS’N OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, LINE-UP PROTOCOL 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2002), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ 
Santa_Clara_Lineup_Protocols.pdf. 
 110. See Eisley, supra note 98. 
 111. See Univ. of N.C. Law School Innocence Project, Advisors—Chris 
Mumma, http://www.law.unc.edu/studentorganizations/IP/index.aspx?ID=131 (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
 112. TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003), available 
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf (listing Detective Lieutenant Kenneth 
A. Patenaude as the co-chair of the Identification Team responsible for authoring the 
manual). 
 113. Univ. of Wis., New Criminal Justice Commission Formed for Wisconsin 
(Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.news.wisc.edu/11471.html. 
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Justice Training and Standards Bureau, is very willing to share 
Wisconsin’s guidelines and successful implementation strategies with 
other states. 
CONCLUSION 
Mistaken identification is the primary cause of convicting the 
innocent and we have learned a great deal about how to enhance the 
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence.  Hence, in the quest to 
improve the criminal justice system through preventing the conviction of 
the innocent and facilitating conviction of the guilty, reforms to how 
eyewitness identification evidence is collected, preserved, and used must 
take center stage.  These reforms include using the reasonable-suspicion 
criterion to avoid lineups when it is not likely that the suspect is the 
culprit, using only one suspect per lineup, using sequential rather than 
simultaneous lineups, instructing witnesses that the culprit might not be 
in the lineup, selecting fillers that do not make the suspect stand out, 
using a double-blind lineup administrator, and recording a certainty 
statement at the time of the identification. 
Psychological scientists have been working diligently on procedures 
to improve eyewitness identification accuracy, but the gap between what 
we know from this science and the implementation of reform is a wide 
one.  There are no national mechanisms to institute reform because crime 
investigation procedures are locally controlled.  Even at the state level, 
there is only one state that has statutory control over local police 
departments.  Accordingly, reform of lineup procedures is proceeding on 
a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis largely by a process of persuasion.  
How this will ultimately play out on a widespread basis is yet to be 
learned. 
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